
Paul Graham points out that big company checks on purchasing
usually have costs, such as purchasing checks increase the costs of
purchased items because the vendors have to factor in their costs
of passing the checks.
Such things happen constantly to the biggest organizations of all,
governments. But checks instituted by governments can cause much worse
problems than merely overpaying. Checks instituted by governments can
cripple a country's whole economy. Up till about 1400, China was richer
and more technologically advanced than Europe. One reason Europe pulled
ahead was that the Chinese government restricted long trading voyages. So
it was left to the Europeans to explore and eventually to dominate the
rest of the world, including China.
—
The Other Half of "Artists Ship",
by Paul Graham,
November 2008
I would say western governments (especially the U.S.) subsidizing
petroleum production and not renewable energy is one of the biggest
source of current world economic, political, and military problems.
Of course, lack of checks can also have adverse effects as we've
just seen with the fancy derivatives the shadow banking system
sold in a pyramid scheme throughout the world.
It's like there should be a balance on checks.
Which I suppose is Graham's point: without taking into account
the costs of checks (and I would argue also the risks of
not
having checks), how can you strike such a balance?
He doesn't neglect to apply his hypothesis to SOX:
Continue reading "Checks on Checks, or Shipping and Shipping Software " »

What can you expect when public, press, and government think "hacker"
means criminal?
The UK government has published guidelines for the application of a law
that makes it illegal to create or distribute so-called "hacking tools".
...
A revamp of the UK's outdated computer crime laws is long
overdue. However, provisions to ban the development, ownership and
distribution of so-called "hacker tools" draw sharp criticism from
industry. Critics point out that many of these tools are used by system
administrators and security consultants quite legitimately to probe for
vulnerabilities in corporate systems.
The distinctions between, for example, a password cracker and a password
recovery tool, or a utility designed to run denial of service attacks
and one designed to stress-test a network, are subtle. The problem is
that anything from nmap through wireshark to perl can be used for both
legitimate and illicit purposes, in much the same way that a hammer can
be used for putting up shelving or breaking into a car.
—
UK gov sets rules for hacker tool ban,
Consultants in frame? Definitely Maybe
By John Leyden, The Guardian,
Published Wednesday 2nd January 2008 15:54 GMT
How long will it be before a simple traceroute gets you not only
disconnected from your ISP but also clapped in jail for "hacking"?
It gets better:
Continue reading "Hammers to be Outlawed in UK" »
Fergie points out
a university project investigating censorship:
The "Great Firewall of China," used by the government of the People's
Republic of China to block users from reaching content it finds
objectionable, is actually a "panopticon" that encourages self-censorship
through the perception that users are being watched, rather than a true
firewall, according to researchers at UC Davis and the University of
New Mexico.
The researchers are developing an automated tool, called ConceptDoppler,
to act as a weather report on changes in Internet censorship in
China. ConceptDoppler uses mathematical techniques to cluster words by
meaning and identify keywords that are likely to be blacklisted.
—
University Researchers Analyze China's Internet Censorship System,
News Report,
Government Technology News,
Sep 11, 2007
So the Great Firewall of China watches what users are doing by
actively intercepting their traffic.
Meanwhile,
back in the U.S. of A., how about a passive web panopticon?
Continue reading "Web Panopticons: China and U.S." »
Shades of SOX complaints: the U.S. GAO
reports that
the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA)
is failing:
When we go out and conduct our security control reviews at federal agencies,
we often find serious and significant vulnerabilities in systems that
have been certified and accredited.
Part of it, I think, is just that agencies may be focusing on just
trying to get the systems certified and accredited but not effectively
implementing the processes that the certification and accreditation is
supposed to reflect.
—
Q&A: Federal info security isn't just about FISMA compliance, auditor says,
Most agencies still have security gaps, according to Gregory Wilshusen,
by Jaikumar Vijayan
Computerworld,
June 14, 2007
Sounds like
they haven't implemented numerous simple security measures that were known
before FISMA, they don't have processes to do so, and they don't adequately
report what they're doing, even with FISMA.
What to do?
Continue reading "FISMA Failing" »
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